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Notes
Federal and State
Regulation of the Variable Annuity
The variable annuity is presently subject to both federal
securities regulation and state securities or insurance regula-
tion. The author of this Note analyzes the present regulatory
systems and concludes that, at present, no system alone, nor
any combination of systems provides adequate protection
for the interests of buyers and sellers of variable annuities.
The Supreme Court recently held1 that the variable annuity 2
does not qualify for exemption as an "insurance policy" or an "an-
nuity contract" under the Securities Act of 1983, 3 and that vari-
able annuity companies are not exempt from the Investment Com-
pany Act of 19401 since they are not "insurance companies." 5 The
1. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
2. A variable annuity is a contract which does not provide customary fixed-dollar
annuity payments. Rather, income varies according to the current value of a portfolio
of common stocks in which the funds paid for the contract have been invested.
Johnson, The Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 INs. L.J. 357;
Note, The Classification and Regulation of Variable Annuities, 42 MinN. L. REV.
1115 (1958).
3. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958). The act exempts:
Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity
contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like func-
tions, of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.
48 Stat. 76 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1958).
The Court held that the companies involved were not issuing contracts of insur-
ance, since in a variable annuity contract "there is no true underwriting of risks, the
one earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived of in popular under-
standing and usage." 359 U.S. 65, 73 (1959).
4. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1958).
5. The 1940 act exempts "any ...insurance company." 54 Stat. 798 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1958). An insurance company is:
a company which is organized as an insurance company, whose primary and
predominant business activity is the writing of insurance or the reinsuring of
risks underwritten by insurance companies, and which is subject to supervision
by the insurance commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State.
54 Stat. 793 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(17) (1958).
Since the Court held that for purposes of the act the companies were not issuing
insurance contracts, their "primary and predominant business activity" could not
be "the writing of insurance." Hence, the companies were not exempted from the
1940 act.
This Note distinguishes between two types of companies that sell variable annui-
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effect of this holding is to put the variable annuity under the regu-
latory jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
to open the way for dual federal-state regulation of the variable
annuity by the SEC and state insurance or securities administrators. 6
The variable annuity raises peculiar problems of regulation be-
cause it is not strictly a form of insurance, nor is it strictly a se-
curity; it has aspects of both.7 A variable annuity is marketed as
an insurance contract" designed to enable the purchaser to secure,
after retirement, a monthly income for life, the purchasing power.
of which will remain constant in spite of the effects of inflationY
The company invests the contractholders' funds in equity securi-
ties on the theory that changes in the value of the portfolio will cor-
respond to changes in the cost of living.10
The purpose of this Note is to determine how the variable an-
nuity should be regulated. The Note will first examine the various
interests of buyers and sellers of variable annuities, and then ana-
lyze the capabilities of the three present regulatory systems-
SEC, state securities, and insurance - to adequately protect these
interests.
ties: a company, such as the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, which
specializes in the sale of variable annuity contracts is referred to as a variable annuity
company, in contradistinction to an insurance company which sells variable annuities
as well as "regular" insurance.
6. Much controversy has raged over whether the variable annuity is a security, a
form of insurance, or something in between. Compare Haussermann, The Security in
Variable Annuities, 1956 INs. L.J. 382 and Long, The Variable Annuity: A Common
Stock Investment Scheme, 1956 INs. L.J. 393, with Johnson, The Variable Annuity:
What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 Is. L.J. 357 and Day, A Variable Annuity
Is An Annuity, 1955 INs. L.J. 775. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. decided
that, for federal purposes, the variable annuity is a security - at least until Congress
speaks to the contrary. However, each state must decide for its own regulatory
purposes how to classify the variable annuity. Three states have already classified it
by statute. In New Jersey, the variable annuity may be sold by insurance companies,
N.J. Laws 1959, ch. 122. Georgia and Kansas classify it as a security. GA. CODE
ANN. § 97-102(i) (Supp. 1957); KAr. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1261(e) (Supp. 1957).
In Minnesota, the question has not been formally presented as yet, since no company
has sought permission to sell variable annuities in the state. The Department of
Commerce has informally decided, however, that if and when a company does seek
permission to sell variable annuities in Minnesota, they will be regulated as securities.
Interview With Assistant Commissioner of Securities, in St. Paul, Nov. 5, 1959.
7. See note 6 supra.
8. See the specimen policy appended to the district court opinion, SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521, 529 (D.D.C. 1957).
9. See Johnson, A Report On Variable Annuities, 181 WEEKLY UDnavwiu=
610 (1959). In theory, as the dollar is devaluated by inflation, and prices rise, the
dollar value of the variable annuity investment portfolio will rise correspondingly.
The contractholder's monthly income will increase as a result of the higher value
of the portfolio, thus enabling him to maintain his purchasing power in spite of
higher prices. See Johnson, supra note 2.
10. Ibid.
I. THE INTERETS OF BurnRs AND SELLEms
A. Burw's IMM TS
The typical purchaser of a variable annuity is not in a position
to protect his own interests. First, he is unversed in the finer points
of selecting a contract to fill his particular needs. He lacks the
specialized knowledge necessary to assure himself that he is being
fairly treated. Second, the buyer is investing a relatively large
amount of money in the contract over a period of many years. He
probably will not become aware of any serious deficiencies in the
contract, or realize he has misunderstood its provisions, until he
is supposed to start receiving income, when it is too late to rectify
the situation.
Since the buyer is not a capable judge of the adequacies of a
variable annuity contract, he must rely on the salesman's judgment
to a great extent. Therefore, the salesman must be competent; he
needs a working knowledge of variable annuities, gained through
special training, and an understanding of the special function they
serve in providing a hedge against the uncertainties of the future."
The salesman should be required to demonstrate his competence
by passing a comprehensive examination on the subject of variable
annuities prior to being granted the privilege to sell them.
The salesman should present the facts about variable annuities
in an accurate and understandable form so that the buyer may
know exactly what he is getting for his money. The buyer should
not be led to expect unrealistically high returns because a salesman
was overly optimistic in predicting future market trends. 12 Nor
would the salesman be treating the buyer honestly if he did not im-
press upon him the fact that monthly income could, and probably
would, go down as well as up. 13
11. See note 9 supra.
12. It would be unwise, as well as unfair, to project past investment experience
into the future to predict income. If a company were to use predicted long-run
inflation as a selling point, it could find itself with many dissatisfied customers and
a poor reputation, if the national economy took a deflationary turn. In its new
variable annuity regulatory statute, New Jersey has prohibited projection of past
investment experience into the future. N.J. Laws 1959, ch. 122, § 5(b).
18. The New Jersey statute requires that "any [variable annuity] contract . . . de-
livered or issued for delivery in this State . . . shall contain on its first page, in a
prominent position, a clear statement that the benefits or other contractual payments
or values thereunder are on a variable basis." N.J. Laws 1959, ch. 122, § 4.
If he purchases a "pure" variable annuity, the buyer takes the risk that he might
receive no income. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71
(1959). He might receive no income if the portfolio became substantially worthless.
To avoid this risk, it is proposed to "balance" the variable annuity by using some
of the funds paid in to buy a fixed annuity. See Johnson, supra note 2. The balancing
would serve as a floor below which the monthly payments would not fall.
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Along with being assured of a competent salesman, the buyer
also has an interest in dealing with a company that uses fair busi-
ness-getting methods, particularly honest advertising. The advertis-
ing should completely present the facts about variable annuities,
describing the functions they serve and pointing out the risks as
well as the advantages.
Most purchasers probably would not bother to read the entire
contract, before or after signing. Even if the typical buyer did read
the contract, it is quite unlikely that he would be able to understand
it, or to determine his rights under it, because variable annuity con-
tracts are replete with complex language such as "accumulation
units," "annuity units," and "net investment factor."14 Since the
purchaser probably cannot adequately judge the quality of such a
complex contract for himself, he has an interest in being assured
that the contract conforms to reasonable standards of fairness."5
The purchaser of a variable annuity seeks a safe investment, but
at the same time he seeks high earnings. The buyer's interest calls
for a balance between safety, with the attendant low earnings, and
the risks which accompany the possibility of high earnings. He
would also be vitally concerned with having a solvent company on
hand during the full period he expects to receive income.
B. SELLER'S INTERESTS
Since the seller of a variable annuity is certain to be regulated
in one manner or another, it has an interest in avoiding dissimilar
or conflicting types of regulation. It would favor a system which
would treat the variable annuity uniformly in all states. Likewise,
the company should be given equal opportunity to compete with
all other companies selling variable annuities, regardless of the sys-
tem which regulates its activities. It would be unfair to subject a
variable annuity company to one type of regulation while subject-
ing an insurance company selling variable annuities to a different
14. These terms are found in the variable annuity contract issued by the Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Company, a specimen of which is appended to the district
court opinion, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521, 529 (D.D.C.
1957).
15. For example, if the contractholder makes payments for a number of years and
then misses a payment, he should not lose the benefits of the money he has already
remitted. Also, the buyer should have some assurance that the greatest portion of
the money he is paying in is being invested for his benefit, rather than having an
unreasonable percentage of his payments siphoned off for "administrative expenses"
and profit.
If protective clauses are not included in the contract itself, it is doubtful that the
buyer could force inclusion of such clauses. It might never occur to him that he
needs such protection; even if it did, he would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to have the contract changed. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
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type, since one or the other might be subject to stricter regulation."
The company would also be interested in operating under a regu-
latory system which would permit sufficient freedom of investment
so that it could carry a large program of variable annuities. This
would reduce average administration expenses, and permit a greater
spreading of both actuarial and investment risks. In order to oper-
ate a large, diversified portfolio most effectively, and to apply the
theory underlying the variable annuity,17 the company would desire
a substantial amount of freedom in making investment choices.
II. THE RiEGULATORy SysTMis
A. SEC REGULATION
Federal regulation of the variable annuity falls within the scope
of the Securities Act of 1933, which controls the issuance of securi-
ties to the public, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, which
regulates the business of investment companies.'
Securities Act of 1983
Securities regulation is based on a philosophy of "full disclo-
sure."1 9 It assumes that if the prospective buyer has all the facts
before him, he is in a position to make his own decision regarding
the merits of a security, and can intelligently elect whether or not
to buy. The SEC does not approve or disapprove any security; it
makes no claims or guarantees about safety or earning power. 0
The buyer alone must decide whether the security is a desirable
investment.
The Securities Act of 1933 provides that any security which is
proposed to be publicly offered by using the channels of interstate
commerce or the mails, must be registered with the SEC before it
may be lawfully sold.2' A registration statement containing detailed
disclosures on matters concerning the general character of the is-
suers business must be filed.22 There is then a twenty-day waiting
period, during which prospective investors may familiarize them-
selves with the proposed offering.23 In addition to the filing of the
registration statement, the 1933 act requires that prospective buyers
16. There is a distinct possibility that the two types of companies will be accorded
different regulatory treatment. See text accompanying notes 49-52 infra.
17. See note 9 supra.
18. See generally, Loss, SEcuITES REGuLATIoN (1951, Supp. 1955).
19. DAvis, Ani-masmATrVE LAW § 42 (1951).
20. See 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
21. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
22. 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1958). All information required in the
registration statement is set out in 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1958).
23. 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1958).
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be furnished with a prospectus, which is a written offer to sell the
security.24 Since detailed information is required, the prospectus is
usually a lengthy document, often running to fifty pages or more.25
As well as providing machinery for full disclosure, the 1938 act
also contains anti-fraud provisions 26 which afford civil relief by
way of injunction2"t and criminal penalties for fraud in the sale of
securities. 8
Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains several classi-
fications of investment companies. 29 A company selling variable an-
nuities apparently falls within the classification of an "open-end
management company." 30 All investment companies which make
use of the facilities of interstate commerce or the mails must regis-
ter with the SEC to lawfully transact business. 31 The information
which must be filed is determined by rules and regulations of the
Commission.3 2 If the Commission thinks it necessary "in the public
interest or for the protection of investors," the company must
include in the registration statement its policy on such matters as
borrowing money, issuance of senior securities, concentration of
investments in a particular industry or group of industries, and
portfolio turnover.33 Advertising concerning the securities issued
by the company must be filed before, or within ten days after, it is
24. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1958).
25. Loss, SEcURrrIES REGULATION 159 (1951).
26. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958), reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any security by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
27. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1958).
28. 48 Stat. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1958).
29. See 54 Stat. 799, 800 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a--4, -5 (1958). An invest-
ment company is one which engages "primarily in the business of investing and
reinvesting in securities of other companies." Loss, op. cit. supra note 25, at 94.
80. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 85 (1959) (concur-
ring opinion). An "open-end management company" is defined by the statute as one
"which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is
the issuer." 54 Stat. 800 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a--5(a)(1) (1958).
31. Registration procedure and information requirements for investment companies
are set out in 54 Stat. 803 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1958).
32. 54 Stat. 803 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1958).
33. Ibid. The section also prescribes other information which the Commission may
require if it sees fit.
sent through the mails or channels of interstate commerce. 4 The
act also contains capital requirements for investment companies" 5
and detailed restrictions on their management practices. 6
Protection of the Buyer's Interests
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for the federal reg-
istration of "brokers." 37 Although the definition 38 of "brokers" may
be broad enough to include securities salesmen,39 there are no re-
quirements for special training or examination. Thus, a prospective
purchaser would have no assurance that the person with whom he
is dealing possesses even a minimum of competence to sell a com-
plex variable annuity contract. Similarly, a buyer has no assurance
that he will get the facts regarding the variable annuity in a form
understandable to him so that he can make an intelligent choice
to buy or not. The method of disclosing the facts is by prospectus,
which is a useful tool for the experienced investor, but it would be
ineffective for the typical buyer contemplating the purchase of a
variable annuity. It would be unrealistic to assume that he would
read such a lengthy, complex document. 40 He does not need, nor
probably could he use, the detailed information found in the pros-
pectus. Rather, the simple facts of the variable annuity, such as
how it can fulfill his particular retirement needs, what he is getting
for his money, and the risks entailed in getting it, are sufficient to
enable him to make an intelligent choice.
Although the prospectus itself is ill-adapted to present the facts
in a manner useful to most people, the usable facts may accompany
the prospectus.41 To assure that the buyer will have access to un-
derstandable facts, such additional explanatory material in plain
language should be a requirement for variable annuities, rather
than a mere option.42
34. 54 Stat. 826 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) (1958).
85. 54 Stat. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1958).
36. See, e.g., 54 Stat. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-21 (1958), which deals with
loans by management companies. How these restrictions affect variable annuity
companies is illustrated in SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2908, Aug.
20, 1959. The SEC ordered a hearing on the applications of two variable annuity
companies to be exempted from certain provisions of the 1940 act. The Release
discusses the provisions from which the companies sought exemption.
37. 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1958).
38. "The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank."
48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(4) (1958).
39. See Loss, op. cit. supra note 25, at.723.
40. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
41. See 48 Stat. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(10) (1958), Loss, op. cit. supra
note 25, at 182.
42. The 1933 act does not require that explanatory material accompany the
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Under SEC regulation there is a great deal of freedom to con-
tract since the SEC cannot require that any specified terms be in-
cluded in a variable annuity contract. As long as the contract does
not perpetrate a fraud upon the buyer, the parties may include
any terms they see fit, and are limited only by their respective bar-
gaining positions. In dealing with a particular company, the buyer is
at a definite disadvantage in seeking changes in contract terms.
Since the contract is on a printed form which the agent may not
have the authority to change, the buyer's only practical choice is
to buy or refuse to buy.43 Perhaps the exigencies of competition
would force the various companies to include certain clauses for
the buyer's benefit, but clearly this would not give as much assur-
ance as a statutory or administrative requirement.
The SEC, through its supervisory power,44 can often coerce the
issuer of a security to conform to the Commission's desires, such as
by an amendment to the contents of the registration statement.45
However, the supervisory power of the SEC does not seem strong
enough to force a variable annuity company to incorporate fair
provisions in the contract, because the coercive element is not
nearly so strong as it is in the case of a traditional distribution.
First, the time element is not so crucial because a variable annuity
does not need to respond to market conditions that fluctuate hourly.
It will not get "sticky," as will a "capital-raising" security, because
it fails to be issued at the precise moment it is expected to appear.
Second, even if a stop order were issued, it would not impair public
confidence very greatly because the typical purchaser would almost
never be aware of such a fact.46
prospectus, although the prospectus itself "shall contain such ...information as
the Commission may ...require as being necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(c)
(1958).
43. Even an executive who has sufficient authority to make changes in contract
terms would probably be reluctant to make changes in a printed form just to suit
the mood of a particular buyer.
44. The supervisory power of the SEC is discussed in 1 DAvis, AnMxns-rnAarvE
LAW TnE AnSE § 4.01 (1958).
45. If the SEC does not approve the registration statement as filed it has the
power to hold up the security issue by a stop order proceeding. The twenty-day
waiting period does not start running again until the Commission is satisfied. The
SEC also has authority to accelerate the issue. 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §
77h(b) (1958). The threat of a stop order, and the power to accelerate, are two
effective coercive weapons used by the SEC when it desires additional information
in the registration statement. The SEC may refuse registration if it appears that the
statements made in the registration statement are incomplete or inaccurate, or
misleading. 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (c) (1958).
46. When a "capital-raising" security is held up by a stop order, the prospective
buyers lose confidence in the issue. It is then difficult to sell. See 1 DAvis, Aimiuns-
TRATIV LAw TAEATisE § 4.01 (1958).
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The SEC can prevent deceptive or misleading advertising re-
garding the sale of securities through its control over the terms
of the prospectus, which is a form of advertising. Also, the anti-
fraud provisions of the 1933 act have a deterrent effect on issuers
who would use deceptive advertising practices, since it is a crime "to
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.""1'
The 1940 act does not contain investment controls.48 Apparently
a company may invest the funds of variable annuity contracthold-
ers in any securities it chooses. This contains an element of danger
since a company might purchase too many speculative securities,
thus imperiling the safety of the portfolio. Investment controls
should be applied to assure the buyer that the investment portfolio
will contain good grade stocks, on the average, and that the port-
folio will be well-diversified to produce a steady income. A serious
disadvantage of the 1940 act is that it probably does not apply to
an insurance company selling variable annuities as a part of its
overall program.49 The buyer must look to state regulation alone
to assure himself that such a company will remain sound.
Protection of the Seller's Interests
A company selling variable annuities might have difficulties in
determining whether it must comply with the 1933 act alone, or
the 1940 act as well. It is clear, as a result of the decision in the
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. case,50 that a company which spe-
cializes in selling variable annuities must comply with both acts.
However, a company which sells insurance policies as well as vari-
able annuity contracts cannot be certain whether it must comply
with the 1940 act because, by its terms, the 1940 act apparently
exempts an insurance company which sells variable annuities as
only one element of its whole program. The question that must first
be determined is whether writing insurance is the company's "pri-
mary and predominant business activity."," If the question is an-
swered affirmatively, the company is exempt from the 1940 act.52
47. 48 Stat. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(3) (1958). The requirement under the 1940
act that advertising must be filed with the SEC before it is used, see note 34 supra,
would deter advertisers from putting extravagant claims in advertising material. See
54 Stat. 826 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) (1958).
48. But see 54 Stat. 807 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) (1958); 54 Stat. 809(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1958).
49. See note 5 supra, and text accompanying notes 50--52 infra.
50. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
51. 54 Stat. 793 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(17) (1958), quoted at note 5
supra.
52. An argument can be made, however, that if an insurance company uses a
segregated fund for its variable annuity contracts this fund is subject to SEC regu-
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Because of this doubt as to the exact coverage of the 1940 act, a
company, although it has great freedom to contract and invest,
cannot be assured of equality of regulatory treatment and equal
freedom to compete, since a company regulated by both acts would
be more closely supervised than a company having to comply with
the 1938 act alone.
B. STATE SEcUPrrMs REGULATION
Basically, state security, or Blue Sky, laws fall into three cate-
gories, each with a different approach.53 Although some states use
only a single type in their statutes,54 most Blue Sky laws are a com-
bination of the various types.5 5 The simplest type is the anti-fraud
statute, which generally provides that it is a misdemeanor to use
fraudulent methods to sell securities.56 A state officer is usually
given power to investigate, and can enforce the provisions by in-
junction or criminal prosecution.5"
The second type of statute requires that broker-dealers and
agents must be registered.58 The information required in the reg-
istration form varies from state to state. In some, such as New
York, the registration requirements are little more than adjuncts
to the anti-fraud provisions; 5 9 in others, such as Pennsylvania,
the application for registration of agents must be accompanied by
"evidence . . establishing the good repute in business of the
applicant. ... 60
The third type of statute requires registration of the securities
themselves. 61 But the usual Blue Sky law goes beyond the disclo-
sure requirements of the Securities Act of 1938, since the adminis-
lation. The 1940 act definition of a "company" includes a "fund." 54 Stat. 791
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8) (1958). The segregated fund cannot be said to
be "organized as an insurance company" since it is established for purposes of
investing in securities with proceeds from the sale of other securities-the variabl;
annuity contracts. Hence the fund would not qualify for exemption as an "insurance
company." See note 5 supra.
58. Loss & Cow=u', BLuE Sr LAw 19 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loss &
CowETr].
54. For example, New Jersey has a simple fraud statute. See New Jersey securities
law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:1-2, -4 (1955); Loss & Cow-rr 20.
55. Ibid. Minnesota, for example, incorporates all three types in its Blue Sky law.
See MnN. STAT. §§ 80.07, .12-.181, .22-.23 (1957). In Loss & Cow-rr 89-41,
Table A, the states and the type of law each uses are listed.
56. Loss & Cowunr 21. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:1-4, -25 (1955).
57. Loss & CowErr 21. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. AxN. §§ 49:1-11, -12 (1955).
58. See Loss & Cowzrr 26-0. See, e.g., MqNN. STAT. § 80.12 (1957).
59. Loss, op. cit. supra note 25, at 27. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352 to 352-b,
359e to 359ee.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 84 (Supp. 1957).
61. Loss & CowE-r 30-41. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 80.07 (1957).
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trator concerned may pass on the merits of the security.6" An admin-
istrator may refuse to license a security and prohibit its sale if he has
doubts as to its quality. Reasons for such a refusal could be, for ex-
ample, bad faith of the issuer, insufficient information upon regis-
tration, or that the sale would be against "public interest." 3
The most inclusive protection is afforded when all three types of
statutes are incorporated in a state's Blue Sky law. Since Minnesota
makes use of all three types of protection,"4 its Blue Sky law will be
used for illustrative purposes.
Protection of the Buyer's Interest
A salesman must be licensed to sell securities in Minnesota. 5 The
securities commissioner is given broad powers to grant or deny an
agent's or dealer's license. 6 The Securities Division, by rule, requires
"satisfactory evidence . . . of the trustworthiness . . . and...
competency" of the applicant," which "shall be in writing or shall
be determined by oral or written examination before the Commis-
sion." 6 s Although, in practice, an examination is not often used,69 it
is clear that the commissioner could require an examination on the
subject of variable annuities as a prerequisite to licensing, if he
thought it necessary to protect investors.70
Close supervision is exercised to prevent fraudulent practices.
Applications for registration are examined, and if the commissioner
"is of the opinion that the securities are fradulent [sic], or .. .that
the sale thereof would work a fraud or deception on the purchasers,"
he may deny the application.7' Similarly, the registration of securities
presently outstanding may be revoked for fraudulent practices.
72
The administrator may conduct an examination of the books and
records of the issuer of securities, so that he may better determine
whether the sale of the securities would work a fraud on investors. 73
Thus, the buyer is assured that the contract itself will not be fraudu-
lent. He is also protected against fraudulent, high-pressure sales
tactics since the Securities Division, by rule, considers it fraudulent
62. See Loss & Cowa-r 35-36. See, e.g., MnmN. STAT. §§ 80.08, .11 (1957).
63. See Loss & Cow=-r 31-36. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421:27 (1955).
64. See note 55 supra.
65. MINN. STAT. § 80.13 (1957).
66. See MINN. STAT. § 80.13 (1957).
67. Minnesota Securities Laws, Rules and Regulations, Rule II1(a) (1959).
68. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
69. Interview With Assistant Securities Commissioner, in St. Paul, Nov. 5, 1959.
70. See Mius. STAT. § 80.13 (1957).
71. Mnw. STAT. § 80.08 (1957).
72. MnqN. STAT. § 80.11(2) (1957).
73. MINN. STAT. § 80.11(1) (1957).
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"for any dealer, broker or agent, in offering or selling securities, or
in making or offering to make any transaction in securities, know-
ingly to make or furnish any untrue or misleading statement, either
oral or written, of a material fact, or to omit to state a material
fact." 7'
If the advertising of the company issuing the securities contains
an offer to sell, or renders advice regarding the securities, it must be
filed with the Securities Division before it may be disseminated
through the ordinary channels to the public.75 Because of this pro-
vision, companies use "tombstone ads," which are no more than
descriptions of the security.7 6 No advertising of any kind is per-
mitted if the securities have not been registered in Minnesota, or
with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1983. 7r Such provisions
furnish the prospective buyer with adequate protection against un-
fair or misleading advertising.
The Blue Sky law does not offer sufficient protection to assure a
fair contract. There are no statutory requirements that specific
clauses be inserted for the buyer's benefit. The administrator seem-
ingly has sufficient discretionary power to require that specific
clauses be included in the contract before it will be granted approval
on application for registration, since he may deny registration for
"good cause appearing" to him. If registration were denied, the
company would have to comply with the commissioner's demands
or forgo the sale of the contracts in Minnesota. However, in prac-
tice, registration is not denied for lack of specific clauses in invest-
ment contracts. °
The Blue Sky law does not prescribe capital structure require-
ments for investment companies such as a variable annuity com-
pany, but the Commission does makes an inquiry into the financial
status of the company when determining whether registration of the
securities should be denied or revoked."' If the company seems to
be operating on a "shoestring," the security will not be registered."'
An examination of a company's financial status would seem to be
as effective as an initial capital structure requirement. However, the
Blue Sky law does not provide sufficient assurance that the company
will remain sound. It prescribes no investment controls, but permits
the company to make investments as it chooses.
74. Minnesota Securities Laws, Rules and Regulations, Rule VII (1959).
75. MrNN. STAT. § 80.18 (1957).
76. Such an advertisement is not an "offer to sell," nor does it "render advice"
concerning the securities.
77. MsiN. STAT. § 80.18 (1957).
78. MmN. STAT. § 80.08 (1957).
79. Interview With Assistant Securities Commissioner, in St. Paul, Nov. 5, 1959.
80. Ibid. See MmN. STAT. § 80.11(1) (1957).
81. Interview With Assistant Securities Commissioner, in St. Paul, Nov. 5, 1959.
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Protection of the Seller's Interests
Even assuming the variable annuity were to be regulated under
the Blue Sky laws in every state, a seller could not presently be
assured of uniformity of regulation, because of lack of uniformity
among the laws of the several states.8 2 However, under the Blue
Sky laws, as under SEC regulation, companies have a great deal of
freedom in their business activities due to lack of restrictions on
contract provisions and their freedom to invest funds as they please.
The different types of companies selling variable annuities would
be regulated similarly regarding their sales of variable annuities,
since both types of companies would have to register their securities
and comply with the other facets of the Blue Sky laws."'
C. INSuRANC. REGULATON
Insurance regulation is designed to assure the buyer that the
company will be able to meet its financial obligations as they ma-
ture.84 It is administered in a paternalistic spirit, on the assumption
that the buyer is not able to adequately protect his own interests.8
Insurance regulation exists in all states.86 Some states have more
comprehensive laws than others, but in broad outlines the statutes
are much alike. They make use of such devices as licensing of com-
panies and agents, capital and investment controls, and statutory
policy provisions.87
Protection of the Buyer's Interests
Although insurance agents must be licensed in all states,88 some
82. See Loss & Cowrr 39-41, Table A.
88. The Minnesota Department of Commerce will apparently treat variable
annuities the same as any other securities. They will not receive special regulatory
treatment. Interview With Assistant Securities Commissioner, in St. Paul, Nov. 5,
1959.
From the aspect of practical administration the typical Blue Sky law is not so
inclusive as it appears to be. The statutes generally exempt insurance companies or
securities issued by them. E.g., CAL. CoR'. LAw § 25100(h) exempts "any security
issued by a company organized for the purpose of transacting an insurance business,
the issuance of which is subject to authorization by the Insurance Commissioner."
Also, from a practical standpoint, the enforcement of the usual Blue Sky law is
greatly hampered by the fact that enforcement agencies are understaffed and agents
underpaid. See Loss & Cow=TT 57-62. But insurance commissions are not free from
this problem, see Kimball & Hansen, The Utah Insurance Commissioner: A Study of
Administrative Regulation In Action, 5 UTAH L. REv. 429, 434-86 (1957). Nor is the
SEC -its staff has been reduced almost 60% since 1940, mostly due to successive
budget cuts. Loss, SEcURITs REGULATIoN 388 n.11 (Supp. 1955).
84. See PATTERsON, Essumuvs OF INSuRANCE LAv 2-3 (2d ed. 1957).
85. Ibid.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Not all control devices are used in all states, nor do all control devices apply
to all types of insurance in all states. See notes 98-114 infra and accompanying text.
88. PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 84, at 45.
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states do not have a statutory requirement of an examination as a
qualification.89 As yet, only one state expressly requires an examina-
tion on the subject of variable annuities, 0 but, in many states, it is
apparently within the discretion of the insurance administrator to
require that this subject be included in the examination if he thinks
it is necessary." If a salesman must demonstrate his competence
before a license is issued, the state has an effective tool to assure that
only competent salesmen are licensed. It is clear, however, that in
a state where a license is given almost as a matter of course, the
buyer cannot be assured of a competent salesman.
The agent's business-getting methods are regulated by statutes
which prohibit "twisting" 92 and misrepresentation. 93 In Minnesota,
for example, the tactics of the agent are regulated by an unfair prac-
tices act.94 It is a misdemeanor to procure payment of, or an obliga-
tion to pay, an insurance premium by fraudulent representations.9 5 It
is also deceptive practice to misrepresent "the terms of any policy is-
sued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby
or the dividends or share of the surplus to be received there-
on. . . ." 96 Thus, a salesman could not be too optimistic about the
future income from the variable annuity contract, since he could not
honestly represent what that income would be. The statute also
prohibits the dissemination of any form of advertising which is "un-
true, deceptive, or misleading." 9
89. E.g., the insurance code of Missouri contains no provisions requiring an
examination as a qualification for a license. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 375.010-.920
(1952). However, even in states which have no specific statutory requirement, the
commissioner usually has a great deal of discretion, and may require some type of
examination to obtain a license. For example, the commissioner in Wyoming must
be satisfied that the applicant is "worthy and competent" before the license will be
issued. Wyo. Coar. STAT. ANN. § 52-803 (1945).
90. New Jersey requires an examination on the subject of variable annuities before
a salesman may be licensed. N.J. Laws 1959, ch. 122, § 3. The provision applies to
those already licensed to sell insurance as well as to new applicants. West Virginia,
by rule, requires an examination. See note 91 infra.
91. This falls within the commissioner's discretionary power to determine the
scope of the examination. E.g., "No person shall be licensed by the commissioner as
an insurance agent or solicitor if the commissioner shall be satisfied that the person
is incompetent or unqualified to act as an insurance agent or solicitor.... MINN.
STAT. § 60.68 (1957). In West Virginia, the commissioner requires an examination
on the subject of variable annuities, for experienced as well as inexperienced insur-
ance salesmen planning to sell the variable annuity. Official West Virginia Ins. Dept.
Reg. 56L-2, Governing the Sale of Contracts on a Variable Basis, August 29, 1956.
92. "Twisting" is a means of inducing a policyholder, by misrepresentations or
incomplete comparisons, to cancel his contract with company A and take out a
substantially similar contract with company B. See PATrERsON, op. cit. supra note
84, at 41.
93. See id. at 40-43.
94. MwN. STAT. §§ 72.20-.85 (1957).
95. M-NN. STAT. § 72.05 (1957).
96. MmrN. STAT. § 72.23(1) (1957).
97. MINN. STAT. § 72.23(2) (1957).
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Most state insurance laws have provisions dealing with policy
content.98 The standard provisions which must be included in cer-
tain types of policies are set out by the statute, in substance if not
verbatim. These statutes typically require such things as a grace
period,99 a nonforfeiture clause,' and reinstatement. 101 Some states
have standard provisions for annuity contracts, 0 2 while others ex-
cept them from the standard provision requirements.0 3 As yet, ex-
cept in New Jersey, 4 statutory controls of policy provisions are not
aimed specifically at regulating variable annuity contracts.
98. E.g., m. STAT. §§ 61.80-.84 (1957).
99. E.g., MnqN. STAT. § 61.30(2) (1957). This statute prevents the policy from
lapsing if the premium is not paid on the exact due date.
100. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 61.30(8) (1957). This statute provides for procedures
on lapse of a policy to assure the policyholder that the money paid in is not a total
loss. This feature would be essential to protect the purchaser of a variable annuity.
101. E.g., MIN. STAT. § 61.30(10) (1957). By this clause the policy can be put
back in force within a certain time after lapse.
102. See, e.g., A=uz. Rrv.. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1219 to -1224 (1956) by which
provisions similar to those found in the text accompanying notes 99-101 supra are
required for annuities.
103. E.g., MhN. STAT. § 61.38(1) (1957).
104. N.J. Laws 1959, ch. 122. The statute reads in part:
4. Any contract on a variable basis delivered or issued for delivery in this
State, and any certificate evidencing variable benefits issued pursuant to any
such contract on a group basis, shall contain a statement of the essential features
of the procedure to be followed by the insurance company in determining the
dollar amount of variable benefits or other contractual payments or values
thereunder and shall state in clear terms that such amount may decrease or
increase according to such procedure. Any such contract delivered or issued for
delivery in this State, and any such certificate, shall contain on its first page, in
a prominent position, a clear statement that the benefits or other contractual
payments or values thereunder are on a variable basis.
5. (a) ... The commisisoner shall disapprove or withdraw approval of any
such contract form, application or certificate if:
(i) such contract or application or certificate contains provisions which are
unjust, unfair, inequitable, ambiguous, misleading, likely to result in misrepre-
sentation, or contrary to law, or
(ii) sales of such contracts are being solicited by any means of advertising,
communication or dissemination of information which involves misleading or
inadequate description of the provisions of the contract, or
(iii) such contracts are being issued in disregard of reasonable regulations
which shall be promulgated by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance
relating to the conditions which must be met at time of issue of an individual
contract on a variable basis for balance whereby (A) provision made for
income from contracts on a variable basis shall not exceed (B) provision
made for income payable in predetermined dollar amount (in whatever form
such provision is made, including, but without limitation to, annuities, pen-
sions, social security or other contracts or plans providing for the payment of
income over a period of time). ...
(b) Illustrations of benefits payable under any contract on a variable basis
shall not involve projections of past investment experience into the future and
shall conform with reasonable regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of
Banking and Insurance.
(c) No individual annuity contract on a variable basis shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this State unless it contains in substance the following
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Insurance regulations contain provisions for maintaining minimum
capital requirements'0 5 and strict investment controls. 06 The mini-
mum capital requirements vary according to the type of insurance
the company issues.' The investment controls are designed to
achieve a sound investment program built mainly around safe, but
low-yielding, debt securities. 10 8
Investment controls are not restrictive enough in the sense that
a company often is permitted to invest a greater percentage of its
assets in one corporation than is consonant with safety. 09 For ex-
ample, suppose a company, which may lawfully invest two per cent
of its assets in one corporation, has common stocks of the variable
annuity program amounting to ten per cent of its total assets. The
company could then back twenty per cent of its variable annuity
program with the stock of one corporation. This could prove disas-
trous if the corporation failed or had some poor years. Therefore,
these controls would be better expressed as a percentage of the
assets available for investment in the variable annuity portfolio,
rather than as a percentage of total assets." 0
Protection of the Seller's Interests
Insurance regulation does not permit the freedom of business ac-
tivity that the SEC and Blue Sky systems do. But, from the insurance
company's point of view, such restriction is not altogether undesir-
provisions:
(i) that, in the event of default in the payment of any consideration beyond
the period of grace allowed by the contract for the payment thereof, the
insurance company will . . . make payment of the value of the contract, in
accordance with a plan provided by the contract, commencing not later than the
date contractual payments by the company were otherwise to have com-
menced in accordance with the contract;
(ii) that, upon request of the contract holder received by the insurance
company at least 4 months prior to the date contractual payments by the
company were otherwise to have commenced, the company will . . . make pay-
ment of the value of the contract, in accordance with a plan provided by the
contract and selected by the contract holder, commencing as of the first
day of the first month which is at least 4 month [sic] after the date of receipt of
such request, unless another date of commencement is requested by the
contract holder and agreed to by the company....
105. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 60.29 (1957). See PATTERsON, op. cit. supra note 84,
at 23--26.
106. E.g., MnN. STAT. § 61.11 (1957). See PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 84,
at 26-29.
107. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 60.29(2) (1957).
108. See the list of permissible investments for domestic companies. Mn-N. STAT.
§ 60.87 (1957).
109. The states generally permit from 1% to 5% of a company's assets to be invested
in one corporation. E.g., Tennessee permits a 2% investment in any one corporation.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-217 (1955).
110. New Jersey solves this problem by requiring a segregated variable annuity
account. See N.J. Laws 1959, ch. 123.
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able, since it prevents unscrupulous companies from selling poor
policies at low prices which tends to drive good insurance from the
market.
Present insurance regulation in most states does not permit an in-
surance company to invest a large percentage of its assets in common
stocks. In most states a company may invest about five per cent to
ten per cent11' of its "admitted assets"" 2 in equity securities. How-
ever, extreme variations range from permitting no investments in
common stock " 3 to permitting a company to invest all of its assets
in common stock." 4 In a state which permits an investment of five
per cent to ten per cent of assets in common stocks, a company with
small capital could not invest enough of its assets in common stocks
to finance a large program of variable annuities. A large program is
preferable because it would allow the company to spread the invest-
ment and actuarial risks over a greater area." 5 Expenses for admin-
istering a small portfolio would also be higher per dollar of securities
purchased. A large insurance company, on the other hand, could
carry a great number of variable annuity contracts. Even five to ten
per cent of such a company's assets would be ample to finance a
large program.116
III. EVALUATION
It is clear that none of the present regulatory systems, standing
alone, can do a completely adequate job of protecting the interests
of both buyers and sellers. The SEC regulation does not assure the
buyer of either a competent salesman or fair contract provisions. The
facts need not be disclosed in a form understandable and usable by
111. E.g., AEm. Ry. STAT. ANN. § 20-536(C) (1956) (10%); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-310.02 (1952) (10%); OTA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1616 (1957) (5%).
112. "Admitted assets" are those which an insurer is permitted to include in
determining its statutory solvency; not included are such things as good will, trade
names, or the insurer's own stock. See PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 84, at 26.
113. The laws of Colorado do not include common stocks in the lists of permitted
investments for domestic life insurance companies. See COLO. 11Ev. STAT. ANN. §§
72-2-8, -10 (1958).
114. The laws of the District of Columbia permit unlimited investments in common
stocks, subject only to the provision that not over 1% of the company's assets may be
invested in any one corporation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-535(10) (1951).
115. If a small company were to use its 5% to 10% limit of permissible investment
in equity securities to back its variable annuity program, it would be unfairly favor-
ing the variable annuity contract holders at the expense of other classes of policy-
holders. The effect would be to decrease the dividends paid to regular policyholders
because only lower-earning debt securities would be available to back the regular
insurance program. Because of the possible unfairness, a segregated variable annuity
account is preferable.
116. Total assets of United States life insurance companies amounted to $101,809,-
000,000 in 1957. 1958 LanE INsuRANcE FAcT Boox 64. Assuming an average of 5%
of total assets as permissible investments in common stocks under present laws, life
insurance companies could back with common stocks a $5,065,450,000 program of
variable annuities.
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the typical purchaser. In addition, the buyer cannot be assured of
the soundness of the companies, nor can the respective companies
be assured of equal opportunity to compete.
Blue Sky regulation is likewise deficient in that there is no require-
ment for examination of salesmen, 1 no investment controls, and no
uniform system of regulation. Insurance regulation is deficient be-
cause, in many states, there are no provisions for standard policy
terms for variable annuities, and because of the strictness of the
investment controls.
Dual regulation of the variable annuity making use of the present
regulatory systems would be little better than using one of the three
systems alone. If SEC and Blue Sky regulation were combined, the
buyer would still lack sufficient protection since he would have no
assurance of a competent salesman and the seller would have to
contend with the lack of uniformity among the various Blue Sky
laws. If SEC regulation were combined with insurance regulation,
the buyer would not be completely assured of a fair contract, and
the seller would have little freedom to invest in equity securities.
There is also a danger that the systems would conflict, particularly
SEC and insurance regulation. For example, the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 requires that all registered management investment
companies place and maintain their securities and investments in a
bank or keep them in their own custody pursuant to the rules and
regulations of the SEC."18 -At the same time, some state insurance
laws require that a company transacting business in the state must
maintain with the insurance commissioner specified amounts of cash
or securities as a condition of doing business." 9 If the company is to
comply with one law, it must be exempted from the other. 2 9
There are three practical possibilities by which the variable an-
nuity could be adequately regulated: 1) exclusive federal regula-
tion; 2) exclusive state regulation; 3) dual regulation. If Congress
decided to give the SEC exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation
of variable annuities, it would also have to pass additional legislation
to give the SEC adequate regulatory tools to protect the interests
of buyers and sellers. If the states were to be granted exclusive juris-
diction to regulate, it would first be necessary for Congress to re-
move the variable annuity from the jurisdiction of the SEC. The
states would then have to give a regulatory agency adequate tools
to enable it to do a proper job. The best exclusive state regulation
117. Although Minnesota does not in practice require an examination of securities
salesmen, see note 69 supra, several other states do. See Loss, Developments in Blue
Sky Laws, 14 Bus. LAw. 1161, 1164 (1959).
118. 54 STAT. 816 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17f (1958).
119. E.g., MNN. STAT. § 60.34 (1957).
120. See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2908, Aug. 20, 1959.
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requires a uniform variable annuity act. An adequate dual system
would result only if the states supplemented present SEC regulation
by giving a state agency power to control the areas not covered by
present SEC regulation. Again, a uniform system would be prefer-
able to avoid conflicts between the legislation of sister states.
